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I. How is Academic Scientific Research Funded? 
  The United States’ “system of innovation” is often touted as one of the most productive 
in the world.  Many consider academic research – much of which is funded through the federal 
government – to be a key pillar supporting that system (Mowery and Rosenberg 1993).  Over the 
past 20 years, the federal government has funded roughly 25% of all academic research.  In 
FY2003 alone, the federal government appropriated more than $22 billion to the scientific 
endeavors of universities (Shackelford, 2004), distributing the funds chiefly through the National 
Institutes of Health (65%), the National Science Foundation (12%), the Departments of Defense 
(8%) and Energy (3%), and NASA (4%). 
  Federal funds for university research are, generally speaking, allocated through two 
mechanisms.  The first, and most common, is a competitive allocation mechanism, which 
accounts for nearly 90% of the federal funds.  The most well-known of the competitive processes 
is “peer-review” selection in which scientists submit proposals for specific research projects to 
federal agencies. These proposals are reviewed by experts in the relevant fields, whose 
evaluations enable the agencies to rank proposals based on perceived scientific merit.  Although 
agencies may incorporate other criteria into their decision calculus (such as, whether a particular 
project will likely yield a result particularly useful to the defense of the country), the peer review 
process is generally seen as a mechanism for allocating scarce funds toward the most promising 
scientific research efforts (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993).    2
  Despite this, several critics have raised questions about the benefits of the peer review 
system.  Prominent legislators and academics have argued that the peer review process 
effectively serves to concentrate research funding among a few elite schools whose scientists 
populate the peer review boards (Gray 1994).  In the eyes of critics, the peer review process also 
tends to reward “safe” research projects that conform to accepted beliefs, thus starving truly 
breakthrough research (Silber 1987).   
  In recent years, and partly as a response to these types of critiques, a second means of 
allocating funds has assumed increasing importance.  Known as “academic earmarking,” this 
second method is a political process that entirely bypasses the peer review described above.  
Academic earmarking is the process by which legislators place specific provisions in the 
government’s annual appropriations bills requiring specific agencies to allocate specified levels 
of funding to designated universities for particular projects (Savage 1999).  As part of the federal 
appropriations bills, these earmarks become law.   
  In FY2003, the U.S. budget included 1,964 academic earmarks, accounting for more than 
$2 billion, or just over 10% of all Federal funding for academic research (Brainard and Borrego, 
2003).
1 More striking is the rate at which academic earmarking has grown. Since 1980, earmarks 
have increased 59x in real dollar terms, representing a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
19.4%, accelerating in recent years to a CAGR of 31% since 1996. In contrast, since 1980, 
overall federal funding of science has experienced a 2.4x growth, or CAGR of less than 4%.   
Together, these data demonstrate that academic earmarking accounts for an increasing share of 
the total federal research budget for universities, and that the rate of its share capture has 
increased substantially over the past decade. 
                                                 
1 The Chronicle of Higher Education collects and cleans data on these earmarks. We use the Chronicle’s data in the 
statistical studies described below. Data are available at http://chronicle.com/stats/pork/ (registration required).    3
   The rise of earmarking has sparked a significant debate among universities, policy 
makers, and political economists as to the wisdom of this approach.  Many in academe have 
decried the growth in earmarks, fearing that increased earmarking will inevitably cut into the 
amount of federal funding for research that will be allocated through the peer review process.  
These same critics often lament the desire of elected officials to steer money toward politically 
beneficial projects, which may not coincide with projects of high scientific potential.  Supporters 
have argued, however, that politicians, not peer review boards, can best represent the needs and 
long-term interests of the country and taxpayers. As noted above, these supporters contend that 
the peer review system does not allocate resources optimally, and that only radical change can 
help middle-and lower tier schools compete with those who have, for years, been entrenched in 
the top tier. 
This paper sheds light on the above debate by examining the evidence related to several 
key questions: Are academic earmarks distributed differently than competitive funds? If so, then 
what determines the allocation of earmarked funds, and how productive are earmarked research 
grants?  In answering these questions, we first examine the supply side of earmarks.  We show 
that a university’s political representation is a significant predictor of whether that university 
receives academic earmarks.  Indeed, members of the House and Senate Appropriations 
committees send a disproportionate amount of academic earmarks to their home districts.   
We then explore the demand side.  It is here that results are somewhat striking.  While 
some earmarks do simply “appear on the doorstep” of universities, a large portion of academic 
earmarks are directed to universities at the universities’ request.  That is, universities proactively 
lobby their political representatives in Washington for academic earmarks, and these   4
representatives then deliver upon the request.  Moreover, universities who profess to eschew 
earmarks actually, at times, lobby and receive these exact same earmarks they profess to avoid.  
The paper then examines the literature on the quality of research that emanates from peer-
reviewed and earmarked research projects.  The few studies to date suggest that earmarked 
funding leads to research with lower impact than does competitive funding, and that universities 
that receive earmarked funding at one point in time do not subsequently improve their research 
standing. Finally, we explore what this all means for the future of science funding.  Namely, we 
discuss the pro-active role of universities in seeking academic earmarks, and what advantages 
and disadvantages such a system may provide. 
 
II. The Distribution of Academic Earmarks 
Figure 1 presents data on the success of medium-sized Carnegie I universities at 
obtaining federal research funding through each of the two channels described: peer-review 
grants and earmarked grants.  If allocation decisions in these channels are driven by similar 
processes, or based on similar university capabilities, then we would expect a strong positive 
correlation between the amounts of money received through each funding channel.   A cursory 
glance at Figure 1 shows no obvious positive correlation between funding levels through 
competitive grant processes and funding levels through academic earmarks.  Indeed, a 
correlation analysis confirms that these two funding levels are not correlated (σ = -.01).   
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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A closer look at the figure reveals that several of the universities that fare particularly well at 
obtaining legislative earmarks are located in the states and districts of Senators and 
Representatives who have strong roles in the U.S. Congress, notably West Virginia University 
(Robert Byrd, Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee), University of New 
Mexico (Jeff Bingaman, Senate Deputy Democratic Whip; Ranking Member, Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee), University of Hawaii (Daniel Inouye, 2nd-ranking Democrat, 
Senate Appropriations Committee), and University of Missouri (Richard Gephardt, House 
Minority Leader).  This suggests that the political power of a university’s legislators may play in 
role in the allocation of academic earmarks. 
 
II.a. Supply of earmarks 
The U.S. Congress has a long tradition of legislators directing money to their districts.  
Historically, this has manifested itself in farming subsidies, highway grants, and other 
infrastructure projects.  According to both the public choice theory in political economy and 
popular belief, such actions help legislators to enhance their re-election chances by enabling 
them to claim credit for creating local jobs and otherwise bringing to their districts a “fair share” 
of government largesse.  Universities, however, are relative newcomers to this game.
2    
Despite the relatively recent entry of universities into this arena, there is both qualitative 
and quantitative evidence that earmarks are often supplied because legislators see it as in their 
                                                 
2 The debate over academic earmarking thus fits within the broader literature on federal discretionary 
spending and congressional committee structure.  In this literature, there are conflicting results as to 
whether representation on a committee results in that committee spending more of the committee budget 
in committee-members’ districts than in non-committee members’ districts.  A small group of studies 
finds that committee members direct spending into their districts (e.g., Ferejohn 1974, Hall and Grofman 
1990, Plott 1969), while a large number of studies find no effect (e.g., Mayer 1991, Ray 1980). Others 
have found mixed results (e.g., Anagnoson 1980, Arnold 1981). 
   6
interest to supply such services to constituent universities.  Qualitatively, Savage (1999) recounts 
an instance in which John Murtha (D-PA), a member of the House Appropriations Committee, 
wrote into an appropriations bill an earmark from the Department of Defense for Marywood 
College, a small Catholic college in his district, that the school did not request and for which it 
had no obvious use (Savage 1999: 133).  Quantitatively, Table 1 offers statistical evidence 
concerning the unconditional means of academic earmarks allocated during the 1997-1999 
period.  This table shows that the average earmark awarded to a university whose Senator served 
on the Senate Appropriations Committee was more than double that of a university whose 
Senator did not serve on this committee.  The average earmark awarded to a university whose 
Representative served on the House Appropriations Committee was higher still, roughly triple 
that of a university without such committee representation. 
   . 
<INSERT “TABLE 1” HERE> 
  
Figure 2 revisits the legislative earmarks obtained by medium-sized Carnegie I 
universities.  In this figure, however, university identities are replaced by information on the 
HAC and SAC representation enjoyed by each school. Two features stand out from this figure.  
First, the vast majority of schools that receive substantial earmarks have HAC or SAC 
representation. Second, Senate representation appears to be more heavily associated with 
earmarks than does House representation; 52% of schools in this sample with SAC 
representation received more than $10 million in earmarks, whereas 43% of schools in the 
sample with HAC representation received more than $10 million in earmarks. As a point of 
comparison, 100% of schools with both HAC and SAC representation received more than $10   7
million in earmarks; while only 6% of schools with no HAC or SAC representation received 
earmarks greater than $10 million. The evidence in the figure (and in Table 1) suggests that 
academic earmarks have become much like other earmarks—a mechanism for legislators to 
funnel discretionary federal spending to their districts in precise and directed ways.   
 
<INSERT “FIGURE 2” HERE–> 
 
 
II.b. Demand for Earmarks 
  The previous section focused on the incentive and ability of legislators to supply 
academic earmarks to their districts.  In this section we address the role of universities in the 
process.  Institutions of higher learning have hardly been passive recipients of earmarks.  Rather, 
universities have dramatically increased their efforts to lobby Congress specifically to obtain 
earmarked funds.  Although university lobbying dates back to well before the Second World 
War, the modern practice of lobbying for earmarks began in the late 1970s.  In 1978, Tufts 
President Jean Mayer, keen to build a nutrition center at the university, sought out lobbyists 
Gerald Cassidy and Kenneth Schlossberg to press his case with their contacts in Congress. 
Cassidy and Schlossberg ultimately succeeded in getting into a 1979 appropriations bill a line 
stipulating that the Department of Agriculture should give Tufts University $32 million towards 
costs of building a new nutrition center (Savage 1999: 102).  Perhaps more important, this effort 
led Cassidy and Schlossberg, and other universities, to recognize the opportunity to lobby for the 
federal funding of directed academic earmarks.  By the late 1990s, such lobbying had developed 
into a cottage industry. Nearly 300 universities lobbied during at least one year between 1997 
and 1999; most of these hired professional lobbyists from one of a handful of firms dedicated to 
lobbying for academic earmarks, while others also maintained a staff of internal lobbyists for this   8
purpose.  These universities spent $160 million on lobbying during this time period (de 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006).
3 
  To be sure, not all university lobbying is directed at obtaining earmarks.  A small number 
of “elite” universities lobby for science policy (for example, increased budgets for the National 
Science Foundation; or rules that will facilitate stem cell research).  Indeed, many elite schools 
deny that solicitation of earmarks is an integral part of their lobbying campaigns.  However, a 
recent sunshine law, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (and its attendant technical 
amendments in 1996), requires all organizations that spend more than $20,000 in a given year on 
lobbying to disclose information about these lobbying efforts.  One can review these lobbying 
reports for evidence of the locus of lobbying efforts. Three things are clear from such a review.  
First, middle- and lower-tier schools direct virtually all of their lobbying efforts and expenditures 
toward academic earmarks.  Second, even those elite schools that decry the practice of academic 
earmarking often devote at least some lobbying effort to seeking earmarks.  Third, the degree to 
which elite schools are engaging in lobbying, and obtaining earmarks, has been steadily 
increasing over time. 
  When the phenomenon of academic earmarking first appeared in the 1980s, the 
Association of American Universities – a trade association of 62 elite research institutions that 
account for the lion’s share of competitively-awarding federal research funding – publicly called 
for the cessation of such earmarks. But over time, the AAU was less able to present a united 
front on this issue.  By the late 1980s, a number of AAU member schools began to pursue 
earmarked funding, and AAU members engaged in often-rancorous debate about the propriety of 
accepting and soliciting earmarked funds.  Despite several attempts by individual schools to lead 
                                                 
3 Brainard (2002) finds that the total is approximately $90 million.  We have been unable to reconcile these figures 
with our own.   9
efforts to collectively refuse to pursue or accept earmarks, in FY2003 90% of the AAU 
membership (54 of the 60 U.S. members) accepted at least one earmark.
4  In 2003, AAU 
members received a total of $336 million in earmarks, representing 21% of all earmarked funds.  
  Table 2 revisits the statistical evidence concerning academic earmarks that was first 
presented in Table 1, but now includes information on lobbying expenditures by universities.  
The table shows the statistics for all universities, and also for the “lobbier” (lobbying 
expenditures > 0) sub-sample. In the full sample, the results show that the average university 
with no representation on the SAC spent $9,430 lobbying, and received an earmark of $144,693, 
for an unconditional average return of roughly $15 for every $1 spent on lobbying. However, 
universities with representation on the SAC lobbied about 40 percent less than their non-
represented counterparts, yet received just over two times the earmark, for an unconditional 
return on investment of almost $56 for every $1 spent on lobbying. Universities with 
representation on the HAC obtained an unconditional return on investment of almost $25 for 
each $1 spent on lobbying.  Results are similar when the analysis is limited to those institutions 
that actually lobby. 
 
<INSERT “TABLE 2” HERE–> 
 
While the static unconditional means provide the first glimpse of an interesting story, we 
can gain additional insight by examining appropriations committee “switchers.” Although there 
are few legislators who rise to or leave the appropriations committees in any year, there were 
four switchers on the Senate Appropriations Committee after the 1998 election.  In that election, 
Senator Lauch Faircloth (R-NC) was defeated by Senator John Edwards (D-NC), while Senator 
                                                 
4 The AAU member institutions in the U.S. that did not receive an earmark in FY2003 are Caltech, Duke, University 
of Chicago, SUNY Stony Brook, Washington University in St. Louis, and Yale.  Of these six schools, all except   10
Dale Bumpers (D-AR) retired. Both Senators thus lost their positions on the SAC, and neither 
North Carolina nor Arkansas had another Senator on the committee. Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) 
and Richard Durbin (D-IL) were elevated to the SAC to replace the two outgoing Senators, 
becoming the only Senators from Arizona and Illinois to sit on the committee.  Table 3 provides 
the data for lobbying expenditures and earmarks for the four states affected by these switches. As 
the table shows, there was a large jump in lobbying by North Carolina universities in the year 
after Faircloth’s exit, but the earmarks to North Carolina universities shrank by half in that year.  
Arkansas universities similarly increased their lobbying expenditures after Bumpers’s exit, but 
also saw an increase in earmarks. Table 3 also shows that after Kyl’s ascension to the SAC, 
Arizona universities did not change their lobbying level but did experience a 41 percent increase 
in earmarks.  Durbin’s ascension was followed by an increase in both lobbying and earmarks.  
Thus, in three of the four cases of committee switchers, there is evidence that both lobbying and 
earmarks respond to changes in SAC membership. 
 
--- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ---- 
 
 
The above data might suggest that there is an enormous payoff to lobbying.  However, 
Tables 2 and 3 report unconditional means. It is unclear from these tables how large the return to 
lobbying is after controlling for other factors. While political scientists and economists have 
explored lobbying extensively, both theoretically (Austen-Smith 1993, 1995, Rotemberg 2002, 
Ainsworth 1993) and empirically (Ansolabahere et al 2000, de Figueiredo and Tiller 2001, 
Wright 1996), there has been, until recently, no successful attempt to measure the returns to 
lobbying in a large-scale statistical study.  This has been largely due to data limitations.  But de 
Figueiredo and Silverman (2006), taking advantage of information revealed under the Lobbying 
                                                                                                                                                             
Caltech received at least one earmark in either FY2001 or FY2002.   11
Disclosure Act and of features of academic earmarks that facilitate surmounting other empirical 
challenges, demonstrate that universities that lobby Congress receive dramatically higher 
earmarks than their non-lobbying counterparts – if the lobbying university is in the state or 
district of an Appropriations Committee member. 
 
<INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE> 
  
de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) estimate the elasticities of university lobbying to 
academic earmarks. Figure 3 depicts graphically their results. Notably, a 1% increase in lobbying 
expenditures by a university without representation on the House Appropriations Committee 
(HAC) or Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) results in a 0.15% increase in earmarks, but 
in many specifications the point estimates are not significantly different from zero. In contrast, if 
the university is represented by a member of the HAC or SAC, then this 1% increase in lobbying 
yields a 0.43% or 0.50% increase in earmarks, respectively.  These latter elasticities are 
statistically different from zero.
5  As indicated by the different Y-intercepts in Figure 3, de 
Figueiredo and Silverman also find that, after controlling for lobbying, the main effects of HAC 
and SAC representation increase the average earmark by 16% and 19%, respectively. Thus, 
consistent with the previous subsection’s emphasis on the supply of earmarks, HAC and SAC 
representation result in money being sent to the university in the absence of lobbying. 
In sum, universities get earmarks because they ask for them; although some earmarking 
would persist even without lobbying due to legislators’ supply-side pressures.  The above-cited 
statistical results suggest, and we conjecture, that the active lobbying by universities for 
academic earmarks is partially responsible for the high and increasing level of earmarking.   
   12
III. Earmarks to Research 
  Having discussed the supply and demand for earmark funding by universities, a natural 
question arises: does academic earmarking lead to different research, or research of differing 
quality, than peer-reviewed fund allocation?  A commonly raised concern about academic 
earmarking is that, by distributing research funds to politically connected institutions rather than 
those with the most competitive research proposals, academic earmarks will lead to the funding 
of lower-quality research than will peer review (Brainard and Borrego, 2003).  de Figueiredo and 
Silverman (2006) find that, after controlling for SAC/HAC representation and lobbying, schools 
that receive earmarks tend to be lower-tier research universities (as ranked by the National 
Research Council).
6 In addition, the results also indicate that earmarking redistributes funds 
away from top schools toward lobbying schools with powerful political representation. 
  The fact that, on average, earmarks are bestowed upon lobbying universities with 
appropriations committee representation and on lower-tier schools is not prima facie evidence 
that earmark-funded research is of lower quality than that supported by peer-review. As noted 
above, some have argued that the competitive grant process systematically underrates promising 
projects from lower-tier schools.  Although it is unlikely that this bias would systematically 
affect states and congressional districts of appropriations committee members, the practice of 
earmarking could partially rectify such a bias by funding those promising projects that are 
proposed by lower-tier institutions and also those that are constituents of appropriations 
committee members.  In such circumstances, the research produced by earmark-supported 
research should be no less productive than competitive grant-supported research. Alternatively, it 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 de Figueiredo and Silverman (2003) discuss the details of the average and marginal returns to a $1.00 of lobbying. 
6 In addition, universities with medical schools are more likely to receive earmarks, ceteris paribus.  This may reflect 
the entrepreneurial nature of medical school faculty at pursuing earmarks (Richard Levin, personal communication), 
or it may reflect the political attractiveness of medical research.    13
is possible that earmarked funding to lower-tier schools today will provide resources that enable 
these schools to become higher-tier schools, and thus better able to compete in the peer review 
competition, tomorrow. One can attempt to examine these empirically.   
  There are two tests that can help provide insight regarding the benefits of this 
redistribution.  First, do earmark-funded projects result in significantly better or worse research 
than peer-reviewed projects?  Unless earmark-funded research is measurably less useful than its 
peer-reviewed counterpart, concerns about earmarking could be unfounded. Second, do earmarks 
provide an opportunity for lower-tier schools – who otherwise might not be able to obtain a large 
amount of peer-reviewed funding – to “catch up” to top-tier universities?  If earmarking enables 
schools to improve significantly over the long term, then it may be justifiable even in the face of 
weaker research in the short term. 
A number of recent studies have attempted to compare the importance of research funded 
by peer-review and by earmarking and set-asides.  Payne (2002, 2003) finds that set-asides and 
earmark-funded research generates more papers per research dollar than peer review-funded 
research.  However, the citation rates of these papers are statistically and substantially lower than 
that of peer-review funded projects.  The author interprets this as evidence that earmark-funded 
papers have significantly less impact on subsequent scientific advance.  Though the quantity of 
output is higher, the quality of output is lower when earmarks are present.  
Evaluating the long-term changes in university quality that can be attributed to 
earmarking is difficult, given the only recent widespread diffusion of academic earmarking.  
However, earlier studies of the relationship between a university’s receipt of earmark funds and 
its subsequent change in academic ranking have generally found no systematic effect of earmark 
funds on ranking movement over the past 15-20 years (Savage 1999).  One may argue that the   14
indicators of importance may be noisy, and that the results – which are based on aggregate 
university research productivity – would be different if analyzed on a project-by-project basis.  
Nevertheless, the initial finding across these studies is not favorable to earmarking.  It is clear 
that more research is needed in understanding the productivity of earmarking. 
 
IV. Conclusion: How Do We (Want to) Fund University Research? 
  The earmarking process is one that is now pervasive. It is clear that some of the critiques 
of the peer review process are addressed through earmarking. In particular, academic earmarking 
does result in a redistribution of federal research money away from top-ranked schools to 
middle- and lower-tier schools.  In addition, earmarks are granted to projects that are unlikely to 
be funded through peer review.  Moreover, the money is often allocated to construction projects, 
which, along with overhead, serve to maintain the infrastructure of the university. 
However, these benefits are not without costs.  The evidence suggests that the 
redistribution of money is highly influenced by political representation.  That is, there is a strong 
redistribution effect away from universities without senior representation on the relevant 
appropriation committees and toward those universities with just such representation.  This move 
to the political arena means that universities move resources into private-interest lobbying for 
these earmark grants.  Whether lobbying for earmarks is a public good or a public bad is an open 
question.  The current evidence, however, suggests that not only does earmarking crowd out 
peer-review competitive grants, but it also results in lower quality research (as measured by 
citation rates). 
This raises the important public policy question: how do we want to fund science?  It 
seems that the funding of science has a tipping point.  To the extent that there is a nearly one-for-  15
one substitution of earmarks for peer-reviewed funding,
7 there is cause for concern that, at some 
point, the amount of funding allocated via earmarks will reach a “tipping point” after which we 
will see a rapid, wholesale shift from peer reviewed funding to earmarked funding of most 
academic research.  Put differently, thus far many elite research schools have not pursued 
earmarks with full intensity, and continue to devote the bulk of their lobbying efforts to 
increasing the size of the federal budget for academic research.  But as earmarks consume more 
of this budget, and peer reviewed funding concomitantly less, at some point it will no longer be 
in the interest of the elite research schools to go after the peer-reviewed funds because the pot of 
money will be simply too small.
8  Indeed, we already see that 90% of AAU universities receive 
21% earmark funding.  If earmarking becomes a sufficiently large proportion of the academic 
research funding pie, then all universities will begin toward lobbying for earmarks, and the 
federal financing of academic research may end up resembling highway appropriations, where 
nearly every dollar is earmarked to a particular roadway project.   
Fundamentally, there is a pernicious collective action problem at work here (Savage 
1999). Although it is better for the university research system as a whole to fund research 
through peer review systems, it is individually rational for a single university below some 
threshold level of research quality, to seek out an academic earmark.  However, since this 
earmark reduces the level funding available for competitive grants, the next bottom school who 
                                                 
7 One university president related to us his discussion with a high-ranking official in the Bush 
Administration who told him that if universities would stop receiving earmarks, then the Administration would put 
each and every dollar back into the peer-reviewed pot of money for universities. 
8 The debate over earmarking thus also fits into the broader literature on “good government” and the effect 
of rent-seeking on productivity.  Murphy et al. (1993) demonstrate that rent-seeking behavior is subject to increasing 
returns, suggesting that an initially small amount of rent-seeking behavior can spiral upward toward a high-rent-
seeking equilibrium. High levels of rent-seeking effort can “crowd out” other, more productive efforts.  One 
mechanism for stemming such behavior is for a government to commit to “high quality” policies that effectively 
preclude its giving in to rent-seeking parties (La Porta et al. 1999). Viewed through this lens, the evidence to date 
indicates that scholars have significant cause for concern regarding academic earmarking and its potential effect on 
academic research in the U.S.     16
pursues competitive funding finds it increasingly difficult and shifts its resources from 
competitive review to political lobbying for earmarked funds.  Left unchecked, this process 
continues to raise the threshold below which universities seek earmarks until the peer review 
system eventually unravels.  While the system can likely withstand some amount of earmarking 
without completely unraveling, the substantial and quick rise of earmarking seems to be pushing 
us closer to a tipping point. 
Ultimately, the question that must be answered collectively is, “How do we want to fund 
science?”  As the rise of earmarking shifts the basis of competition for research money, there are 
many questions that we should ask:  Do we want the direction of science to be determined by 
elected officials?  Will the new basis for competition enable lower-tier institutions to improve 
their research capability, and, if so, is this the best way to achieve that goal?  And ultimately, can 
we maintain the extraordinary system of innovation in the United States if we move toward 
earmarking more and more federal science dollars?   
We seem to be on the slope of moving toward increasing acceptance of, and resignation 
to, the earmarking of federal funds for research.  We can alert policy-makers as to the advantages 
and disadvantages of this type of allocation of federal research dollars; it is ultimately up to the 
politicians (suppliers) and university presidents and their lobbyists (demanders) to set the course 
for the future. 
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 Average Earmark
No Senate Appropriations Committee Member $144,693
n=3442
Senate Appropriations Committee Member $313,686
n=3704
No House Appropriations Committee Member $187,331
n=6131
House Appropriations Committee Member $503,839
n=1015
TABLE 1:  MEANS IN RECEIPT OF EARMARKS, FY1997-FY1999
FOR ALL UNIVERSITIES IN DISTRICTS WITH AND WITHOUT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERSAverage Lobbying Expenditures Average Earmark
No Senate Appropriations Committee Member $9,430 $144,693
n=3442
Senate Appropriations Committee Member $5,595 $313,686
n=3704
No House Appropriations Committee Member $7,414 $187,331
n=6131
House Appropriations Committee Member $7,612 $503,839
n=1015
Average Lobbying Expenditures Average Earmark
No Senate Appropriations Committee Member $131,410 $1,157,920
n=247
Senate Appropriations Committee Member $117,750 $2,987,555
n=176
No House Appropriations Committee Member $125,225 $1,477,928
n=363
House Appropriations Committee Member $128,765 $4,588,803
n=60
TABLE 2:  MEANS IN LOBBYING AND EARMARKS, FY1997-FY1999
FOR ALL UNIVERSITIES IN DISTRICTS WITH AND WITHOUT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERS
FOR LOBBYING UNIVERSITIES IN DISTRICTS WITH AND WITHOUT APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERSTABLE 3:  SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SWITCHERS
UNCONDITIONAL MEANS FOR UNIVERSITIES IN THEIR STATES
Lobbying Earmarks Lobbying  Earmarks Lobbying  Earmarks Lobbying  Earmarks
1997 $1,481 $148,863 $0 $104,863 $12,608 $294,129 $10,688 $139,961
1998 $3,425 $164,895 $0 $63,037 $14,782 $295,275 $9,555 $162,745
 
1999 $7,222 $86,112 $606 $141,261 $14,347 $405,523 $11,666 $174,935
Faircloth R-NC Bumpers D-AR Kyl R-AZ Durbin D-IL












































































Figure 1: Federal Money for Medium-Sized Carnegie I Universities
Carnegie I Research Universities with enrollments of 17,000 to 26,500 students for which data is available.
All data is cumulative 1997 to 1999 data.
Government research dollars is total government research dollars awarded to the school from all government agencies (e.g. DOD, DOE, NSF, NASA, USDA, etc.).  
Almost all money is granted through a form of competitive grant-making process.  This data is obtained from the NSF.














































































Figure 2: Federal Money for Medium-Sized Carnegie I Universities, based on 
Political Representation
Carnegie I Research Universities with enrollments of 17,000 to 26,500 students for which data is available.
All data is cumulative 1997 to 1999 data.
Government research dollars is total government research dollars awarded to the school from all government agencies (e.g. DOD, DOE, NSF, NASA, USDA, etc.).  
Almost all money is granted through a form of competitive grant-making process.  This data is obtained from the NSF.
Academic earmarks is the amount of academic earmarks legislated by Congress in appropriations bills.  This data is obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics.
N=44




































Note: The “Neither” category is not statistically significant from zero.